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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is in a civil case from a ruling of the Seventh Judicial District Court,
Carbon County, the Honorable Bryce K. Bryner presiding. As such, the Utah Supreme Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether Article XVI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution forbids Insurers from
demanding first dollar reimbursement of compensation paid to the Andersons from their third
party wrongful death recovery where such reimbursement would completely abrogate the
Andersons' recovery?
This is an issue of law reviewed for correctness. Esquivel v. Labor Comm. of Utah,
2000 UT 66 % 11; 7 P.3d 777, 779. It was preserved below in the Andersons' Opposition to
Insurers' Motion to Dismiss (R. 155).
Whether the Andersons stated a cause of action against Insurers for application of
equitable subrogation to disbursement of any wrongful death recovery in the action against
the third party tortfeasors?
This is an issue of law reviewed for correctness. Esquivel v. Labor Comm. of Utah,
2000 UT 66 Tf 11; 7 P.3d 777, 779. It was preserved below in the Andersons' Opposition to
Insurers' Motion to Dismiss (R. 155).
Whether the trial courts should determine the equitable distribution of any third party
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recovery where an employer seeks subrogation and assets are insufficient to make the
wrongful death heirs whole?
This is an issue of law reviewed for correctness. Esquivel v. Labor Comm. of Utah,
2000 UT 66 If 11; 7 P.3d 777, 779. It was preserved below in the Andersons' Opposition to
Insurers' Motion to Dismiss (R. 155).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Article XVI, Section 5. [Injuries resulting in death - Damages]
The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall never be
abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation, except
in cases where compensation for injuries resulting in death is provided for by law.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106
Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of persons other than employer, officer, agent or
employee of employer - Rights of employer or insurance carrier in cause of action Maintenance of action - Notice of intention to proceed against third party - Right to
maintain action not involving employee-employer relationship - Disbursement of proceeds
of recovery - Exclusive remedy. (Entire text set forth in addendum - attached)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 4, 1998, Karl Anderson was killed while in the course and scope of his
employment with United Parcel Service ("UPS") (R. 129). Appellant Jody Anderson is the
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widow of Karl Anderson and the personal representative of his estate (R. 129). Mrs.
Anderson commenced litigation on behalf of herself and her two children against the parties
responsible for Karl's death but found those parties only insured for losses up to $ 100,000.00
and with minimal other assets (R. 130). Recovery of the $100,000 would not make the
Andersons whole. For example, Mrs. Anderson's expert estimated that merely the economic
losses arising out of her husband's death were $926,434.00 (R. 168-171).
Faced with no recovery for her losses and those of her minor children, Mrs. Anderson
attempted to negotiate the worker's compensation lien with Liberty Mutual Insurance and
UPS (R. 131). Despite UPS's fiduciary responsibilities for Mrs. Anderson's cause of action
under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(2)(a)(I), UPS refused to negotiate settlement of the case
in good faith (R. 131). Rather, Liberty Mutual demanded its lien be paid in full before any
disbursement to Karl Anderson's widow or minor children (R. 131). The result being Mrs.
Anderson and her son would continue receiving worker's compensation, her daughter would
receive nothing and the employer would receive all of the recovery after attorney's fees.
Mrs. Anderson joined UPS and Liberty Mutual as involuntary plaintiffs and crossclaimed for a declaratory judgment that their subrogation claim was controlled by Article
XVI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution and the principles of equitable subrogation (R. 124).
UPS moved to dismiss the cross claim which the lower court granted on May 31, 2002 (R.
140)
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This appeal arises from an Order of Dismissal entered by the Honorable Bryce K.
Bryner in the Seventh Judicial District Court for the State of Utah, Carbon County (R. 202).
The underlying wrongful death action remains before the trial court.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Determination of this appeal is governed by Utah's rules of statutory construction.
Those rules demand the statutes and constitutional provisions at issue be given their plain
meaning, be construed in accordance with their original intent, and avoid unnecessary
constitutional conflict. The trial court's ruling which granted appellee insurers first dollar
reimbursement failed to comply with any of these rules. On the other hand, appellants'
appeal for application of equitable subrogation to third party wrongful death recoveries
comports with them all.
Application of equitable subrogation would prevent any double recovery as intended
by Workers Compensation Act. Only equitable subrogation could prevent a double recovery
either to the heirs of deceased workers, or to workers compensation insurers who have been
paid premiums to undertake the risk of injury or death. Equitable subrogation would also
continue to allow employers to pay no fault compensation to injured workers and protect
employers from damage suits as intended by Article XVI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution.
Only application of equitable subrogation, moreover, would maintain the plain and ordinary
meaning of "compensation" and "damages" as used in the WCA and Section 5. In contrast,
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the trial court's ruling places the WCA's reimbursement provision in direct conflict with
Section 5. The trial court's ruling places limitations on a wrongful death recovery for
"damages" which Section 5 strictly forbids.
Accordingly, equitable subrogation must be applied to wrongful death recoveries from
third parties. Where such a recovery makes the heirs whole, an employer or insurer would
be entitled to excess funds to offset its compensation payments. However, if those heirs are
not made whole, it is they who are entitled to damages from the third party tortfeasor.
ARGUMENT
I.

UTAH'S RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DICTATE
EQUITABLE SUBROGATION MUST GOVERN THE DISTRIBUTION
OF WRONGFUL DEATH DAMAGES PAID BY THIRD PARTIES TO
HEIRS OF DECEASED WORKERS

Resolution of this appeal is governed by certain well-defined rules under Utah law.
First, Utah's Constitution and statutes "are to be construed according to their plain
language." O'Keefe v. Utah St. Retirement Bd, 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998); Salt Lake
City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 850 (Utah 1994). Second, the goal of any such construction "is
to give effect to the legislature's intent based on the purpose of the statute." Esquivel, 2000
UT 66; 7 P.3d at 781. Finally, "[w]hen interpreting statutes, every effort should be made
to interpret them as being consistent with the dictates of the constitution." City of Logan v.
Utah Power & Light Co., 796 P.2d 697, 700 (Utah 1990). Hence, "it is [the Supreme
Court's] policy to interpret a statute if possible to avoid potential constitutional conflicts."
5
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Cole v. Jordan Sck Dist., 899 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah 1995).
The parties' arguments must be governed by these principles. Here, the Andersons'
proposed construction recognizes the plain meaning of the terms used in Utah's Constitution
and the Utah Workers Compensation Act ("WCA"), whereas UPS and Liberty Mutual
("Insurers") simply ignore terms they find contrary to their position. The Andersons'
argument also comports with the intent of the WCA. Insurers, on the other hand, ignore the
intent and purpose of the Act to seek only their own benefit. Finally, the Andersons'
position is consistent with the dictates of the Constitution and the only construction which
would avoid Constitutional conflict between Section 5 and the WCA. Therefore, as set forth
more fully below, Utah's rules of statutory construction dictate equitable subrogation must
govern the distribution of wrongful death damages under the WCA.
A.

THE PLAIN MEANING AND PURPOSE OF THE WCA'S
SUBROGATION PROVISION IS TO PREVENT AN INJURED
WORKER'S DOUBLE RECOVERY OF COMPENSATION IN
ADDITION TO COMPLETE THIRD PARTY DAMAGES

The Worker's Compensation Act has been the law in Utah since 1917. For injured
workers, it is "the exclusive remedy against the employer." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(l).
The Act provides compensation to injured employees, regardless of fault. The Act, however,
does not eliminate an injured employee's ability to additionally sue third parties whose
negligence caused their injuries. Yet, to prevent these two separate claims (one against the
employer and the other against a third party) from resulting in a double recovery, Section
6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34A-2-106(5) provides the employer a subrogation interest in the third party recovery to
recover compensation paid to the injured employee.
Specifically, 34A-2-106(5) directs any damages obtained in a third party action must
be disbursed accordingly: (1) costs and attorneys' fees are paid; (2) "[t]he person liable for
compensation payments shall be reimbursed;" and (3) any remaining damage proceeds are
left for the injured worker and his dependents. According to this Court, "[t]he purpose of
the right of reimbursement established by this section is only to prevent double recovery by
the employee or his or her dependents." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Bliss, 725 P.2d 1330, 1334
(Utah 1986); Oliveras v. Caribou-Four Corners, Inc., 598 P.2d 1320, 1325 (Utah 1979);
Esquivel v. Labor Comm % 2000 UT 66; 7 P.3d 777, 781. The purpose and intent of the
provision is thus clear, to prevent double recovery of both compensation and complete third
party damages.
It should be further noted the WCA expressly distinguishes between "compensation"
and "damages." Specifically, the Act provides that when injured,
(a) the injured employee, or in the case of death, the employee's dependants, may
claim compensation; and
(b) the injured employee or the employee's heirs or personal representative may have
an action for damages against the third person.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(l). Article XVI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution uses the
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same terms. Insurers attempt to bury any different meaning of the terms, but statutory
construction demands they be given their plain and obvious meanings. The distinct meaning
of "compensation" and "damages" has been described by this Court:
Compensation is a concept wholly different from that of damages. Damages
are based upon fault, are generally limited only by the findings and conscience
of the jury, and in death cases are payable to heirs or personal representatives
without regard to dependency. Compensation, on the other hand, generally
has no relation to fault, is fixed or limited by statute, and is payable to
dependents only.
Henrie v. Rocky Mtn. Pack. Corp., 196 P.2d 487, 494 (Utah 1948); Oliveras, 598 P.2d at
1323. Here, the WCA plainly distinguishes between the employee's claim against his
employer for "compensation", and his claim for "damages" against a negligent third party.
B.

THE PLAIN MEANING AND PURPOSE OF SECTION 5 IS TO
PRESERVE THE RIGHT TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH WHILE MAINTAINING AN EMPLOYER'S
LIMITED LIABILITY FOR WORKPLACE INJURIES

Since its original draft, the Utah Constitution has protected the right to sue and
collect damages for wrongful death. In its original form, Article XVI, Section 5 ("Section
5") read,
The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall
never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any
statutory limitation.
This Court has repeatedly stated the purpose of Section 5 is "to prevent the abolition of the
right of action for a wrongful death 'whether in a wholesale or piecemeal fashion."' Malan
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v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 667 (Utah 1984); Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 1X1 P.2d 670, 684
(Utah 1985); Hirpa v. IHCHosp., Inc., 948 P.2d 785, 794 (Utah 1997).
In 1921, in specific response to passage of the WCA, Section 5 was amended. The
amendment added, "except in cases where compensation for injuries resulting in death is
provided for by law." As stated by this Court, "[t]he purpose of the 1921 amendment to the
Constitution was to permit the limitation of an employer's liability for fatal work-related
injuries to the payment of death benefits under the Act." Oliveras, 598 P.2d at 1323; see
also Star v. Industrial Comm 'n, 615 P.2d 436, 437 (Utah 1980); and

Morrill v. J & M

Constr. Co., Inc., 635 P.2d 88, 89 (Utah 1981). As clearly stated, the amendment was meant
to limit an employer's liability to compensation. The amendment allowed the WCA to
substitute an employer's payment of compensation for an injured worker's civil action
against his employer for wrongful death. Berry, 111 P.2d at 680 (finding substitute
legislative remedy must provide comparable protection to claimant's person or property).
Otherwise, the amendment left damage recoveries untouched. Hence, damages for wrongful
death still could not be limited or restricted in any way.
Despite the narrow scope of the 1921 amendment, Insurers argue the amendment also
granted the legislature, through the provisions of the WCA, the power to distribute wrongful
death damages in third party actions. The trial court agreed ruling: "The constitutional
provision is clear that recovery from the third party is not subject to limitation except in those
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instances where compensation is provided for by statute" (R. 200). As set forth below, this
position ignores the plain distinction between a claim for compensation against an employer
and a claim for damages against a third party. It ignores the intent and purpose of Section
5 and the WCA and places the WCA subrogation provision in direct conflict with the
Constitution. Thus, the trial court's ruling should be overturned.
II.

APPLICATION OF EQUITABLE SUBROGATION IS REQUIRED TO
PRESERVE THE PLAIN MEANING AND INTENT OF SECTION 5
AND THE WCA, BOTH OF WHICH WOULD BE FRUSTRATED BY
INSURERS' CLAIM TO FIRST DOLLAR REIMBURSEMENT FROM
THE ANDERSONS' WRONGFUL DEATH RECOVERY

Equitable subrogation must be applied to third party recoveries in wrongful death
cases to avoid Constitutional conflict between Section 5 and the WCA's subrogation
provision.

Insurers argue, on the other hand, the WCA grants them first dollar

reimbursementfromany third party proceeds when they have paid compensation. Based on
the exception in Section 5, "except in cases where compensation for injuries resulting in
death is provided for by law," Insurers argue the legislature was granted free reign in workers
compensation cases to distribute wrongful death damages in any way it saw fit.
Both the plain meaning and purpose of Section 5, as well as the intent and purpose
of the legislature in passing the WCA, are maintained by the application of equitable
subrogation, while ignored by Insurers' demand of first dollar reimbursement. There is no
question the amendment to Section 5 allowed the WCA to substitute an employer's
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compensation payments for the heirs' wrongful death action against the employer. But it did
not give the legislature the power to limit or restrict damages obtained in third party lawsuits
for wrongful death. Rather, third party claims for damages remain governed by the preamendment Section 5 which specifically states "the amount recoverable shall not be subject
to any statutory limitation."
The plain meaning of the terms "compensation" and "damages" have been established
and differentiated by this Court. Section 5 dictates the Andersons' right of action to recover
damages against a tortfeasor cannot be abrogated nor subject to statutory limitation. The
amendment to Section 5 excepts one class of persons from this otherwise sweeping mandate,
i.e. an employer who pays workers compensation. The plain language of the amendment,
however, does not affect the Andersons' claim against a tortfeasor responding in damages.
In the instance of a tortfeasor responsible for damages, the Andersons' right to recover
explicitly "shall not be subject to statutory limitation." Insurers' application of the WCA's
subrogation provision cannot be read as anything other than a statutory limitation on the
Andersons' third party damage recovery. To avoid this unacceptable conflict, equitable
subrogation must be applied.
Equitable subrogation satisfies the intent and purpose of Section 5 and the WCA
whereas first dollar reimbursement for Insurers does not. The intent and purpose of the
WCA's subrogation provision is to prevent double recovery. It would be impossible for the
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Andersons to approach anything akin to a double recovery in this action. Specifically, the
third party tortfeasors have a liability insurance limit of $100,000. Merely the economic
losses in this case were professionally estimated at $926,434 (R. 168-171). After attorneys'
fees in the third party action, the Andersons would recover approximately $65,000. In
addition to these third party damages, the Andersons received their minimal compensation
from Insurers. Sasha Anderson, daughter of decedent Karl Anderson, was fourteen (14)
years old when her father was killed. She turned eighteen (18) on July 1, 2001. Conley
Anderson, Karl Anderson's son, was twelve (12) years old when his father was killed. He
will turn eighteen (18) on November 14, 2003. Mrs. Jody Anderson, their mother, received
workers compensation benefits of $395 per week until Sasha turned 18, when the amount
was reduced to $390 a week. Thus, the compensation paid by Insurers as a direct result of
Sasha being a dependent under 18 was $5 a week. Insurers currently pay $5 in compensation
benefits for Conley being under the age of 18. In total, Sasha received $845 for the death
of her father. Conley will receive a total of $ 1,195.
There is clearly no danger of the Andersons reaping a windfall or double recovery
from the wrongful death of Karl Anderson. In this sense, this case is very similar to Hill v.
State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 864 (Utah 1988), wherein the tortfeasors'
insurance was clearly inadequate to respond to plaintiff in damages. Regardless, State Farm
demanded full reimbursement of expenses paid to plaintiff which this Court rejected. This
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Court taught, "[s]ubrogation is an equitable doctrine and is governed by equitable principles.
This doctrine can be modified by contract, but in the absence of express terms to the
contrary, the insured must be made whole before the insurer is entitled to be reimbursed from
a recovery from the third-party tortfeasor." Id. at 866. This Court's holding in Hill
demonstrates there is no danger of double recovery where insurance proceeds plus the
maximum contribution possible from a third party tortfeasor do not make a victim whole.
Double recovery will result, however, if Insurers are successful in convincing this
Court the WCA and Section 5 dictate the reimbursement scheme they propound. Insurers
collected premiums to cover the very risk of employee injury and/or death. Yet, if Insurers
prevail, they will command all of the recovery in the third party action, while the children
receive nothing from the tortfeasor. This is a result the Montana Supreme Court recently
found unsupportable. In State Compensation Ins. Fund v. McMillan, 31 P.3d 347 (Mont.
2001), the Supreme Court determined the State Fund was not entitled to subrogation until
the victim was made whole. Otherwise, "[i]t is State Fund who would reap a windfall under
this argument... 'The insurer has been paid for the assumption of the liability for the claim,
and . . . where the claimant has not been made whole, equity concludes that it is the insurer
which should stand the loss, rather than the claimant.'" Id. at 350; quoting Zacher v.
American Ins. Co., 794 P.2d 335, 338 (Mont. 1990). Incredibly, Insurers ignore the irony
of demanding double recovery in direct contravention of the very purpose of the WCA while
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leaving the actual victims of the tort with nothing. Application of equitable subrogation
would prevent either party from obtaining a double recovery.
Similarly, equitable subrogation satisfies the intent and purpose of Section 5 which
is to permit limitation of an employer's liability to payment of compensation under the
WCA. This Court's most recent pronouncement on Section 5 stated the provision was
amended, "to permit the legislature to fix the amount of compensation . . . for wrongful
death, while continuing to prohibit the complete abrogation of the right to recover." Laney
v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, *34 n.9. Here again, the legislature was given the power to
limit an employer's liability to compensation, but was not granted authority to similarly limit
damages. The Andersons' position does not abrogate an employer's protection nor increase
an employers' exposure. As set forth in Section 5, UPS's liability has been and remains
limited to payment of compensation for injuries resulting in death as provided for by the
WCA.
Lastly, there is no support for Insurers' position that the legislature intended to make
Insurers whole by requiring first dollar reimbursement at the expense of the actual victims
of the wrongful death. The WCA is inherently an equitable arrangement. In exchange for
limited liability, the employer pays compensation regardless of fault through a quick and
inexpensive mechanism. It is simply unrealistic to argue the legislature intended this
equitable arrangement to be twisted by Insurers to satisfy only their own interests.
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The Andersons recognize a number of courts have found their legislatures did
abrogate subrogation's equitable foundations by statutorily granting insurance companies
first dollar reimbursement.l However, as stated by this Court in Oliveras, "in neither of these
cases was it necessary to reconcile a constitutional provision such as ours with the language
of the applicable Workmen's Compensation Statute." Oliveras, 598 P.2d at 1325. In Utah,
there is a constitutional provision protecting the Andersons' right to recover damages from
third party tortfeasors which cannot be limited by statute.
There is also the professed understanding the WCA did not statutorily abrogate
equity, but was rather intended to preserve it. For example, in Lanier v. Pyne, 508 P.2d 38
(Utah 1973), this Court stated in dicta,
we think it reasonable to conclude that the rights conferred upon the insurance
carrier should be regarded as secondary to the plaintiffs interest, and . . .
should not be deemed to diminish or adversely affect the right of the injured
employee to proceed against the third party. This is in accord with the purpose
of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which is to benefit injured employees
and not to impair or destroy natural rights which exist by reason of the
common law to sue for the redress of wrongful acts.
Id. at 253. Similarly, in Worthen v. Shurtleff& Andrews, Inc., 426 P.2d 223, 226 (Utah
1967), this Court stated, "[i]t is more reasonable to assume that the Legislature intended this

1

See e.g. AIK Selective Self Ins. Fund v. Bush, 74 S.W.3d 251 (Ky. 2002); Graves v.
Cocke Co., 24 S.W.3d 285 (Tenn. 2000); Cart II v. GeneralElec. Co., 506 S.E.2d 96 (W.Va.
1998); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garry, 574 N.W.2d 895 (S.D. 1998); Neumann v. American
Family Ins., 563 N.W. 2d 791 (Neb. 1997); Nelson v. Rothering, 496 N.W.2d 87 (Wis. 1993);
and Waith v. North Dakota Work. Comp. Bureau, 409 N.W.2d 94 (N.D. 1987).
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application of the [WCA] which comports with its equitable purpose than one which would
bring about a contrary result." These pronouncements are offered merely to show the WCA
is equitable in its purpose, intent and design. That is why the WCA named Insurers as the
"trustees" of the Andersons' action. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(2)(a)(I). It is
incomprehensible the legislature intended the trustee to put its interests ahead of the
beneficiaries, especially with such tragic consequences.
There is simply no basis to assert the legislature attempted to broaden its authority
under Section 5's amendment to include limitations on third party damages or to dispense
with all equitable principles in the drafting of the WCA. It is more reasonable to assert the
legislature did not intend insurance companies to attempt to justify their mendaciousness by
claiming they had the legislature's blessing. Rather, Utah's Constitution and the WCA
demonstrate an intent to do equity.
Utah, hence, is akin to courts which have preserved the equitable foundations of
subrogation and workers compensation schemes in interpreting their statutes. For example,
the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled equitable principles still applied to the state's workers
compensation statutes because, "subrogation is a matter of pure equity, and is never allowed
where it would be inequitable to do so." Meehan v. Philadelphia, 136 A.2d 178, 181 (Pa.
1957). Similarly, inBaio v. Commercial Unionlns. Co., 410 A.2d 502, 506 (Del. 1979), the
Delaware Supreme Court held, "no matter what the form, subrogation is an equitable remedy
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and one who seeks it must, in turn, do equity. That applies in a subrogation claim brought
under a Workmen's Compensation Statute." Likewise, the Arkansas Supreme Court found
that even a statutorily created subrogation interest in the workers compensation carrier could
never arise until the insured was made whole. General Accident Ins. Co. v. Jaynes, 33
S.W.3dl61, 166 (Ark. 2000).
In this case, applying equitable subrogation to third party wrongful death damage
recoveries comports with the intent and purpose of both the WCA and Section 5 by
preventing double recoveries; by preserving an employer's limited liability; and by upholding
the equitable foundation of the WCA. In contrast, Insurers' construction accepted by the
trial court has the actual, pragmatic effect of abrogating the third party wrongful death action
of the Andersons who, absent Karl's death, would have had a lifetime of care,
companionship and guidance. Under Insurers' proffered scenario, the Andersons are entitled
to nothing for the death of their husband and father while Insurers collect premiums plus full
reimbursement of any monies they paid out on those premiums. It is difficult to fathom the
drafters of Section 5 and the WCA ever intended such an inequitable result.
Accordingly, the Andersons stated a cause of action below for the application of
equitable subrogation to any wrongful death damages recovered from the third party
tortfeasors. Insurers' Motion to Dismiss should have been denied and the trial court's
dismissal must be overturned.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT MUST DETERMINE EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION OF WRONGFUL DEATH DAMAGES RECOVERED
FROM THIRD PARTY TORTFEASORS

As equitable subrogation must be applied to wrongful death recoveries from third
party tortfeasors, it is the trial courts which must determine the equitable distribution of such
recoveries. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-201, u[t]he court has exclusive jurisdiction
of proceedings initiated by interested parties concerning the internal affairs of trusts.
Proceedings which may be maintained under this Section are those concerning the
administration and distribution of trusts, the declaration of rights, and the determination of
other matters, involving trustees and beneficiaries of trusts." Thus, the trial courts must
declare the respective interests of the parties in any third party recovery.
Furthermore, the trial courts are vested with the power to demand those respective
interests be defined equitably. Under Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-401, et seq., the trial courts
have jurisdiction over the minor dependents' recovery from any third party settlement. As
stated in the Editorial Board Comment to § 75-5-407, "[t]he section establishes a framework
within which professionals, including the judge, attorney and physician, if any, may be
expected to exercise good judgment in regard to the minor or disabled person who is the
subject of the proceeding." Thus, the trial courts have the power to equitably adjust the
interests of all parties to protect and preserve third party wrongful death recoveries. Only
in such manner can the trial courts exercise their discretion under § 75-5-401, etseq. while
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still giving meaning to the provisions of the WCA.
Accordingly, the trial courts can and must equitably determine the parties' interests
in any third party recoveries.
CONCLUSION
Equitable subrogation must be applied to wrongful death recoveries from third party
tortfeasors under the WCA's reimbursement scheme. Only equitable subrogation would
prevent double recoveries. Furthermore, only equitable subrogation would comply with the
Constitution's mandate to limit an employer's liability to compensation for wrongful death
while placing no restrictions on the heirs' recovery of damages from third party tortfeasors.
The trial court's grant of first dollar reimbursement to Insurers, on the other hand, ignores
the plain meaning and intent of these provisions and places the WCA in intolerable conflict
with Section 5. Therefore, equitable subrogation must be applied to wrongful death
recoveries from third party tortfeasors.

J

DATED thisi^^day of November, 2002.
SILVESTER & CONROY, L.C.

Fred R. Silvester
Spencer Siebers
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
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34A-2-106

UTAH LABOR CODE

34A-2-106. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of
persons other than employer, officer, agent, or employee
of employer - Rights of employer or insurance carrier in
cause of action - Maintenance of action - Notice of
intention to proceed against third party - Right to
maintain action not involving employee-employer
relationship - Disbursement of proceeds of recovery Exclusive remedy
(1) When any injury or death for which compensation is
payable under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
Disease Act is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a
person other than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of
the employer
(a) the injured employee, or, in case of death, the
employee's dependents, may claim compensation;
and
(b) the injured employee or the employee's heirs
or personal representative may have an action for
damages agamst the third person
(2)(a) If compensation is claimed and the employer or
insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation,
the employer or insurance carrier
(l) shall become trustee of the cause of action
agamst the third party, and
(n) may bring and maintain the action either m
its own name or in the name of the injured
employee, or the employee's heirs or the personal
representative of the deceased
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), an employer or
insurance earner may not settle and release a cause of action
of which it is a trustee under Subsection (2)(a) without the
consent of the commission
(3)(a) Before proceeding against a third party, to give a
person described in Subsections (3)(a)(i) and (n) a
reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the
proceeding, the injured employee or, m case of death, the
employee's heirs, shall give written notice of the intention to
bring an action agamst the third party to
(l) the carrier, and
(n) any other person obligated for the
compensation payments
(b) The injured employee, or, in case of death, the
employee's heirs, shall give written notice to the carrier and
other person obligated for the compensation payments of any
known attempt to attribute fault to the employer, officer,
agent, or employee of the employer
(I) by way of settlement, or
(n) in a proceeding brought by the injured
employee, or, m case of death, the employee's
heirs
(4) For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding
Section 34A-2-103, the inured employee or the employee's
heirs or personal representative may also maintain an action
for damages agamst any of the following persons who do not
occupy an employee-employer relationship with the mjured
or deceased employee at the time of the employee's injury or
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death
(a) a subcontractor,
(b) a general contractor,
(c) an independent contractor,
(d) a property owner, or
(e) a lessee or assignee of a property owner
(5) If any recovery is obtained agamst a third person, it
shall be disbursed in accordance with Subsections (5)(a)
through (c)
(a) The reasonable expense of the action, including
attorneys" fees shall be paid and charged proportionately
against the parties as their interests may appear Any fee
chargeable to the employer or carrier is to be a credit upon
any fee payable by the mjured employee, or, m the case of
death, by the dependents, for any recovery had agamst the
third party
(b) The person liable for compensation payments shall be
reimbursed, less the proportionate share of costs and
attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (5)(a), for the
payments made as follows
(l) without reduction based on fault attributed to
the employer, officer, agent, or employee of the
employer in the action against the third party if the
combmed percentage of fault attributed to persons
immune from suit is determined to be less than
40% prior to any reallocation of fault under
Subsection 78-27-39(2), or
(n) less the amount of payments made
multiplied by the percentage of fault attributed to
the employer, officer, agent, or employee of the
employer in the action agamst the third party if the
combmed percentage of fault attributed to persons
immune from suit is determined to be 40% or
more prior to any reallocation of fault under
Subsection 78-27-39(2)
(c) The balance shall be paid to the mjured employee, or
the employee's heirs in case of death, to be applied to reduce
or satisfy m full any obligation thereafter .accruing against
the person liable for compensation
(6) The apportionment of fault to the employer in a civil
action against a third party is not an action at law and does
not impose any liability on the employer The apportionment
of fault does not alter or dimmish the exclusiveness of the
remedy provided to employees, their heirs, or personal
representatives, or the immunity provided employers
pursuant to Section 34A-2-105 or 34A-3-102 for usuries
sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not
An> court m which a civil action is pending shall issue a
partial summary judgment to an employer with respect to the
employer's immunity as provided in Section 34A-2-105 or
34A-3-102, even though the conduct of the employer may be
considered m allocating fault to the employer m a third party
action m the manner provided in Sections 78-27-37 through
78-27-43 1997
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FILED
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND| FORCARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS
JODY ANDERSON, individually and
as Guardian of her Minor Children,
SASHA BREE ANDERSON and
CONLEY KARL ANDERSON;
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, an Ohio
corporation; and LIBERTY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, a
Massachusetts company,

RULING ON UPS' AND LIBERTY
MUTUAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs,
VS.
Civil No. 980700756
JACOB THEODORE GREGORY,
STEPHEN E. GREGORY, HERITAGE
ENTERPRISES IV, an asset trust,

Judge Bryce K. Bryner

Defendants.

The court heard oral argument on UPS' and Liberty Mutual' & Motion to Dismiss on January 11,
2002. The court has read the memorandum and has considered the arguments of counsel and now
issues this ruling.
I. Background
Mr. Anderson, the deceased husband of the plaintiff Jody Anderson, suffered a fatal car
accident while he was in the scope of his employment with defendant UPS.

UPS and its workmen's

compensation carrier, Liberty Mutual, have paid compensation benefits to Mrs. Anderson.
Mrs. Andersonfiledthis action on behalf of herself, as guardian of her children, and on behalf
of UPS and Liberty Mutual, seeking damages for the alleged negligence of the defendants.
She later filed a Cross-Claim against UPS and Liberty Mutual seeking a declaratory judgment
finding: (1) UPS waived its right to statutory subrogation; (2) UPS can have no recovery under
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

equitable subrogation according to the doctrine of unclean hands; or in the alternative, (3) the court
should allocate the distribution of proceeds from any Third Party Action in accordance with the
principles of equitable subrogation.

II. Positions of the Parties
UPS and Liberty Mutual (hereinafter "Liberty") seek a ruling dismissing plaintiff Jody
Anderson's cross-claim against them for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
and in support thereof allege:
1. Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-106 is the legal remedy in a third-party recovery, and a carrier does
not lose its subrogation rights when it attempts to apply this law.
2. UPS and Liberty have no duty to appear in a civil action in order to protect their subrogation
interest.
3. UPS and Liberty owe no duty to Anderson other than the statutory reduction for costs and
attorney fees.
4. "Equitable Subrogation" is not appropriate in this case because statutory subrogation exists.
5. The Utah Constitution is not frustrated by applying Utah's longstanding law of statutory
subrogation.
The Insurers claim they are entitled to first recover because there is a statutory provision in
place, UCA 34A-2-106, which provides that attorney fees should first be paid, then reimbursement
to the carrier who has paid compensation benefits, and the balance is to be then distributed to the
plaintiffs.
Mrs. Anderson claims that she should receive thefirstdollars from any recovery to make her
and her children whole because the Utah Constitution provides that the right to recover damages
shall not be abrogated, and that, according to Mrs. Anderson, is in conflict with the Workmen's
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Compensation Act. To avoid this conflict Mrs. Anderson contends that the principles of equitable
subrogation are appropriate in this case because any recovery will be minimal, and it appear that if
the Compensation Act distribution scheme were followed, all of the recovery would go to the
insurers.
III. Ruling
The court is persuaded that there is no conflict between the Utah constitutional provision
(Article XVI, Sec. 5) and the distribution scheme under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The
constitutional provision is clear that recoveryfromthe third party is not subject to limitation except
in those instances where compensation is provided for by statute.
Although some states have recognized the principle of equitable subrogation in appropriate
cases, no cases have been cited where Utah courts have adopted such a doctrine. Because a statutory
scheme is in place which provides for the disposition of proceedsfroma third party tortfeasor, this
court declines to invoke the concept of equitable subrogation.
The court also finds that UPS and Liberty Mutual did not waive their rights to statutory
subrogation by failing to initiate suit against the defendants nor did they have a duty under Section
34A-2-106 to appear in a civil action in order to protect their subrogation interests. There is no
provision under Utah law requiring UPS or Liberty Mutual to enter an appearance or waive their
rights to subrogation. Section 34A-2-106 (1) clearly provides that the insurance carrier or employer
"... may bring and maintain the action..." The statute does not state that failure to do so will result
in a waiver of subrogation interests.
In summary, the court finds that the cross claim seeks relief contrary to Utah law and it
therefore fails to state a cause of action. The motion to dismiss the cross claim is granted.
DATED this 7

day of March, 2002.

^_^

ce K. Bryner, Judge
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Michael E. Dyer (3786)
KiraM. Slawson(7081)
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC
77 West 200 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-7900
Fax: (801)521-7965

MAY 3 I

Attorneys for UPS and Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JODY ANDERSON, individually
and as Guardian of her Minor
Children SASHA BREE
ANDERSON and CONLEY KARL
ANDERSON; UNITED PARCEL
SERVICE, an Ohio corporation;
and LIBERTY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, a
Massachusetts company,

]
])
;
]
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]
](
;
]

Plaintiffs,

]

vs.

]

JACOB THEODORE GREGORY,
STEPHEN E. GREGORY,
HERITAGE ENTERPRISES TV,
an asset trust.

]
;
)
)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Civil No. 980700756
Judge: Biyce K. Bryner

Defendants.

This matter came for hearing before the court on the 11th day of January, 2002. Michael
E. Dyer of Blackburn & Stoll, LC appeared on behalf of Co-Plaintiffs Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company ("Liberty Mutual") and United Parcel Service ("UPS"). Fred Silvester appeared on
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

behalf of Plaintiff Jody Anderson. The Court reviewed Liberty Mutual's Motion to Dismiss and
supporting Memoranda, and the Plaintiff, Jody Anderson's, Memorandum in Opposition, and
subsequently issued a written Ruling on March 9, 2002. Based upon the Ruling by the Court, it is
hereby,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Jody Anderson's cross-claim against
Liberty Mutual and UPS fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and is hereby
dismissed with prejudice. The Court hereby determines that there is no just reason for delay, and
therefore, further directs that this shall be afinaljudgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) as to the Cross
Claim of Jody Anderson against Liberty Mutual and UPS.
DATED this^V_ day of Msfffo, 2002.
BY THE COURT

02^

Judge Bjyner

A
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL
was faxed and mailed this 31

day ofMftjeh, 2002, to:

Fred R. Silvester
Spencer C. Siebers
Silvester & Conroy, LC
230 South 5th East, Suite 590
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
(801) 532-2270
Robert L. Jeffs, Esq.
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, UT 84603
(801)373-8878
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